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1Abstract
Within decisions, perceived alternatives compete until one is preferred. Across decisions, the playing
ﬁeld on which these alternatives compete evolves to favor certain alternatives. Mouse cursor trajectories
provide rich continuous information related to such cognitive processes during decision making. In three
experiments, participants learned to choose symbols to earn points in a discrimination learning paradigm
and the cursor trajectories of their responses were recorded. Decisions between two choices that earned
equally high-point rewards exhibited far less competition than decisions between choices that earned equally
low-point rewards. Using positional coordinates in the trajectories, it was possible to infer a potential ﬁeld
in which the choice locations occupied areas of minimal potential. These decision spaces evolved through
the experiments, as participants learned which options to choose. This visualisation approach provides a
potential framework for the analysis of local dynamics in decision-making that could help mitigate both
theoretical disputes and disparate empirical results.
2Choosing between two or more available options is an activity extended in time, and during that time,
decisions evolve. The empirical literature on decision making distinguishes between perceptual and value-
based decisions. Perceptual decisions (e.g., “Did I just smell co ee?”) typically become more accurate
the longer they take, up to some threshold (for reviews, see [1, 2, 3]) and approximate optimality [4, 5,
6]. Value-based decisions (e.g., “Would I like a cup of co ee?”), in contrast, exhibit a number of well-
known idiosyncrasies [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. To date, these e ects have, in the main, been explained by theories
concerned with the distribution of outcomes based on utility [12, 13]. Recently, however, there has been
a shift towards the development of models, some informed by perceptual choice models, that attempt to
characterize processes occurring during decision making [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Evidence
of these processes has been derived from patterns of accuracy and response time, but there has been relatively
little research on the behavioral correlates of these processes. The current paper reports an investigation of
sub-decision dynamics and a new visualisation method to facilitate theoretical development in this area.
Important features of decision dynamics can be unveiled by tracking the motor execution that accom-
panies it. Speciﬁcally, researchers have examined characteristics of response trajectories (the path from
initiation of a response to its completion) for decisions under varying conditions. Studies have employed a
variety of response equipment: the computer mouse [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], the Nintendo Wii remote
[32, 33] and a motion-tracking system ﬁxed to digits ([34] see [35, 36, 37] for reviews). For example, Dale
et al. [26] found that participants showed slower and longer response trajectories when they had to choose
between “MAMMAL” and “FISH” to categorize “sea lion” than to categorize “salmon” or “lion”. In social
categorization, participants take longer and show more divergent trajectories when categorizing relatively
androgynous faces (with ambiguous sex features) as “MALE” or “FEMALE,” than when categorizing more
typical male or female faces [29]. In these cases, categorizing more typical exemplars was easier (faster and
more direct) than categorizing exemplars that were atypical or more similar to the incorrect category, a char-
acteristic clearly observable from the response trajectories. These ﬁndings are not limited to categorization.
Spivey et al. [25] demonstrated that phonological competition between available choices was observed in
response trajectories. When asked to “Click the Candle”, participants’ responses were slower and less direct
when required to choose between a picture of a candle and a candy, than when asked to choose between a
picture of a candle and a pickle.
In line with some models of perceptual decision making, the foregoing studies suggest that early in a
decision, distributed neural representations may be partially consistent with multiple outcomes [35, 38, 39].
As time elapses, information accumulates until these unstable patterns of neural activation dynamically evolve
into more stable patterns associated with one of the available outcomes. Competition between outcomes
increases the duration of the early unstable phase during which multiple responses remain possible. This
gives rise to deﬂection in response trajectories from the shortest direct path. For example, in a study of
attitudes, Wojnowicz et al. [39] found that participants responded with greater deﬂection when responding
in opposition to social stereotypes. In addition, in these trials, velocity exhibited early instability followed
by a compensatory increase in velocity, which was predicted by a computational model of decision making
[40, 19]. Indeed, the gradual accumulation of information (sequential sampling) that may underlie the action
dynamics e ect is a common feature of many current decision making models [41].
The foregoing literature suggests that great insights may be gained by tracking decisions as they unfold.
3To date, researchers have investigated neural activity during decision making in an attempt to characterize
the evolution of perceptual [42, 43] and value-based [44, 45, 46] decisions, but few studies have investigated
changes in behavior during value-based decisions [47, 48, 12]. Koop and Johnson examined response tra-
jectories during a version of the Iowa Gambling Task and found that response trajectories towards Good
decks (rewards greater than losses) gradually became more direct across blocks of decisions, whereas response
trajectories towards Bad decks (losses greater than rewards) did not.
One way to conceptualize how we make decisions is to consider the available outcomes as attractors in a
decision space [49, 35]. We make a decision when our behavior reaches the vicinity of one of these attractors.
Killeen [49] provided an account of conditioning as basic physics within which he proposed that behavior
could be understood as movement in a behavior space in which incentives or reinforcers lie at centers of
basins of lowered potential. Responses that are reinforced become more probable and faster over time as
the trajectories in behavior space are warped through contact with these basins. In a similar vein, Spivey
and Dale [35] provided a model of decision dynamics that proposed that response trajectories in a binary
choice may be understood as a path through a two-well attractor landscape. This landscape, the decision
space, is an expression of the cognitive evaluation of the available outcomes in a particular decision and the
motor execution of the response inﬂuenced by this evaluation. More recently, dynamic models of perceptual
decision making inspired by neural models also emphasise the role of attractor dynamics in decision making
[50, 24, 51]. From this perspective, competing outcomes (i.e., valued choices) induce divergent, slow, and
longer action dynamics when those outcomes are near equal in their potentiality.
In the experiments described here, participants played a simple game to gain points, which constituted a
forced-choice simple discrimination task. In each experiment, some choices earned more points than others
and participants gradually learned which choices earned them the most points. Each decision provided two
choices and, in the majority of decisions, one choice earned more points than the other (High/Low, e.g.,
20 points/5 points). In some decisions, participants were required to decide between two choices that were
both worth the same value, either a speciﬁc higher-point value (High/High, e.g., 20 points/20 points) or a
speciﬁc lower-point value (Low/Low, e.g., 5 points/ 5 points). The relative reward in both of these decision
situations is 1, because the available choices in both cases earn precisely the same number of points (20/20 =
5/5 = 1.0). In light of the research summarized thus far, one might expect that, with equipotential response
options, (a) there ought to be competition in both situations, and (b) the degree of competition should be
similar. In actuality, the decision dynamics, both within and across decisions, were markedly di erent in
these two conditions.
Results
Across three experiments, the ratio of the high-point reward to the low point reward was increased: Experi-
ment 1 (7/5; n = 34), Experiment 2 (10/5; n = 37) and Experiment 3 (20/5; n = 55). Learning was faster and
more reliable as the high-point value increased. On average, participants learned more quickly to choose the
higher of the two options in the 20/5 experiment than in the other two experiments; after just 12 decisions,
participants chose the high-value symbol on over 80 percent of High/Low decisions. By halfway through
the experimental session (18 decisions), the high-value symbol was chosen reliably in High/Low decisions in
4all three experiments (see Fig. 1, bottom-left panel). The high-point value also a ected the proportion of
participants who learned to consistently choose the High options. The bottom-right panel of Fig. 1 provides
the distribution of high-point/low-point choice ratio across participants in each experiment. The log2 of
the ratio of the probability of choosing the high choice to the probability of choosing the low choice on any
High/Low decision (i.e., log2(pHigh/pLow) ) is employed as a measure of the degree to which the participant
reliably chose High options in High/Low decisions.1
Mean log2(pHigh/pLow) increased as relative reward increased across experiments. There was a weak
but signiﬁcant positive correlation (r(126) = 0.22, p = .012) between the log proportion of High to Low
responses, log2(pHigh/pLow), and the log proportion of reward magnitudes, log2(MHigh/MLow). We employed
a series of binomial linear mixed e ects models to further analyse this e ect (see Table 1). In line with the
previous observation, the addition of Experiment as a predictor improved the intercept-only model. In this
model, accuracy was signiﬁcantly higher in the 20/5 experiment than the 7/5 experiment, b =  0.5800,z=
 2.589,p= .0096, and it was marginally signiﬁcantly higher in the 20/5 experiment than the 10/5 experiment,
b =  0.4086,z=  1.842,p= .0655. The model was improved by adding the learning e ect across decisions
and log transforming the e ect of trials/decisions better ﬁt the ceiling e ect on accuracy that can be seen in
Fig. 1. In the ﬁnal model, log(Trial) was a strong signiﬁcant predictor, b =1 .1373,z = 11.9905,p<.0001,
but the interaction e ect of Experiment and log(Trial) was not signiﬁcant. There no signiﬁcant di erence in
the change in accuracy across trials between the 20/5 experiment and the 10/5 experiment, b =  0.1454,z=
 1.0232,p= .3062, or between 20/5 and 7/5, b =  0.0666,z=  0.4635,p= .6430.
Data Selection for Trajectory Analysis
During decisions, the positional (pixel) coordinates of the response trajectories were recorded. In line with
previous work on action dynamics (e.g., [25]), we then assumed a coordinate system in which the initiation
of each decision trajectory constituted the origin. The horizontal (x) and vertical (y) axes of the computer
screen constituted the dimensions of this ‘decision space’.
In the analyses of the response characteristics, we ﬁltered out participants who did not appear to learn.
Only participants who chose the high-value symbol in High/Low decisions on 80% of the last 12 decisions
(n7/5 = 26, n10/5 = 26, n20/5 = 48) in each experiment were included. These participants were deemed to have
demonstrated that they had learned the crucial distinction in the experiment. The remaining participants
were considered not to have learned the High/Low distinction well enough for their responses to be comparable
to those who had. The greatest per-experiment proportion of participants satisﬁed this response requirement
in the 20/5 experiment (88%), followed by the 7/5 experiment (77%) and then the 10/5 experiment (71%).
The fact that a greater proportion of participants reliably learned the distinction in the 7/5 experiment than
the 10/5 experiment was unexpected as overall learning (mean pHigh) was better on average in the 10/5
experiment. In the following analyses, we also excluded trajectories in which participants chose a low-value
symbol in a High/Low decision, as we considered such decisions to be errors and errors are known to exhibit
di erent response characteristics (e.g., reaction times [16]) from expected or correct decisions.
1In the literature on basic learning principles (e.g., [52], the log2 ratio is employed as an index of relative allocation of behavior
to two independent responses and it has been shown to be sensitive to relative magnitude of reinforcement.
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Reaction time patterns were not a ected by the increase in relative reward across experiments. In the ﬁrst 12
decisions, reaction times were relatively similar across decision types. In High/Low and High/High decisions,
reaction times gradually decreased throughout the experiments, but, in Low/Low decisions, reaction times
remained consistently high. To examine the e ects of decision type on reaction times across trials, we ﬁt
a series of linear mixed e ects models, using maximum likelihood estimation on log-transformed reaction
times (see Table 2). There was no signiﬁcant e ect of relative reward (Experiment) on log reaction time.
Reaction time decreased signiﬁcantly across decisions, b =  0.0087,t =  14.98,p < .0001, but there was
no main e ect of decision type. The change in reaction times across Low/Low decisions was signiﬁcantly
di erent, b =0 .0081,t =6 .75,p < .0001, from the change across High/Low decisions, the change across
High/High decisions was not b =  0.0004,t=  0.38,p= .7063. That is, as can be seen in Fig. 2, exposure
to the learning context reduced the reaction times of High/Low and High/High decisions, but not Low/Low
decisions.
Maximum Deviation
For each trajectory, we extracted how much a trajectory deviated from the endpoint response option. This is
an additional measure of cognitive conﬂict: If a trajectory has high maximum deviation, it means participants
are moving their computer mouse closer to the alternative response. With a lower maximum deviation, it
reﬂects a more direct movement towards their choice (exhibiting less conﬂict, and more conﬁdence). Similarly
to the reaction times, maximum deviation was relatively similar across decision types in the ﬁrst 12 decisions
and then decreased in High/Low and High/High decisions in the remaining decisions. Maximum deviation
during Low/Low decisions remained consistently high throughout the experiment with a slight increasing
trend. To statistically investigate these patterns, we also used a series of linear mixed e ects models (see
Table 3). Findings were similar to those previously found for reaction times. There was no signiﬁcant e ect of
relative reward (Experiment) or main e ect of Decision type, but maximum deviation decreased signiﬁcantly
across decisions, b = -0.7594, t = -3.26, p = .0011. The change in reaction times across Low/Low decisions was
signiﬁcantly di erent, b = 1.6263, t = 3.37, p =.0008, from the change across High/Low decisions, the change
across High/High decisions was not, b = 0.1921, t = 0.40, p =.6901. As participants progressed through the
experiment, the deﬂection towards the unchosen symbol decreased in High/Low and and High/High decisions
suggesting reduced conﬂict between choices. This did not occur in Low/Low decisions, suggesting persistent
conﬂict in these decisions throughout the experiment. Results, by experiment, are displayed in Fig. 2.
Horizontal Velocity
Within a decision, the available outcomes were presented at the extreme left and right of the experimental
display. As a consequence, competition between the available outcomes may be expressed in the horizontal
component of response velocity (
dx(t)
dt ). To further analyze the competition between outcomes, point to point
velocity in the x direction was calculated and then interpolated to 101 time steps to normalize response time
and provide an average velocity proﬁle in the last 18 decisions for each condition in all three experiments (see
upper panel of Fig. 3). In all three experiments, horizontal velocity towards the eventual choice was slower
6to increase in the Low/Low condition than in the other two conditions, providing evidence of persistent
early conﬂict during these decisions. It is worth remembering that the mean RT of Low/Low decisions was
signiﬁcantly greater than High/Low or High/High decisions, so the evolution of velocity seen in this ﬁgure
underestimates the di erences in real time (Low/Low decisions took approximately 300 ms longer in real
time on average). In binned segments of trajectory (Fig. 3, lower panel), horizontal velocity during the third
quintile (40-60%) was signiﬁcantly lower (p < .05) in Low/Low than both High/Low and High/High in all
three experiments. Otherwise, the evolution of x velocity within decisions was quite similar for equivalent
conditions across the three experiments.
Response Trajectory Shape
If it is harder to make a given response because participants are experiencing conﬂict, then the trajectories of
those responses should be more divergent: They should spend more time between choices, and in some cases
may even move towards the alternative choice before making a response. We interpolated each trajectory into
101 time steps so they could be overlaid into an average plot (see [25, 26]). Trajectories of decisions to the
left-hand choice were reﬂected in the vertical axis at the origin so that all trajectories ended at the right-hand
choice for ease of comparison. The ﬁnal 18 decisions were used because, by this point in all three experiments,
participants were choosing the high point choice on 80% of all High/Low decisions. This is shown separately
for each experiment in the lefthand column of Fig. 4. In all three experiments, trajectories during Low/Low
decisions were very di erent to those observed in High/Low and High/High decisions. In decisions that
included a high-point choice, trajectories were relatively direct, whereas trajectories in Low/Low decisions
exhibited considerably larger deﬂections towards the unchosen symbol. These deﬂections suggest stronger
and more persistent competition between the available response options during Low/Low decisions.
The most conspicuous di erence was between High/High and Low/Low decisions, in which the relative
magnitude of the points available for each choice was the same. In a statistical comparison of x coordinates
(paired t tests) at each interpolated time step [26], Low/Low trajectories travelled signiﬁcantly closer to the
unchosen option than High/Low trajectories for considerable portions of the trajectories (7/5: steps 52 to
101; 10/5: steps 55 to 82; 20/5: steps 57 to 93) and closer than High/High trajectories for similar portions
(7/5: steps 41 to 90; 10/5: steps 55 to 75; 20/5: steps 50 to 94). In addition, in Experiments 1 (7/5) and 3
(20/5), small portions of the High/High decision trajectories were signiﬁcantly closer to the eventual choice
that High/Low trajectories (7/5: steps 29 to 53; 20/5: steps 44 to 52; departures of less than 8 consecutive
points were not considered signiﬁcant to preserve family-wise error-rate), o ering some weak but signiﬁcant
suggestion that High/High decisions may have been easier than High/Low decisions. It is also worth noting
that this facilitation of High/High over High/Low was earlier in the trajectories than the conﬂict e ects
observed in the Low/Low trajectories.
Modeling Decision Space
By connecting empirical action dynamics with systems of di erential equations, insightful new visualizations
of decision spaces are possible. We sought to characterize the cognitive landscape from which decisions
emerge. Using momentary velocities and accelerations derived from the positional coordinates in the decision
7trajectories, we inferred a potential ﬁeld that captured characteristics of this decision space. Low choices in
High/Low decisions were included in these analyses.
Using the computer-mouse coordinates collected during choices, it was assumed that motion during a
choice can be described by a potential ﬁeld given by the function V (x,y)=Vx(x)+Vy(y), where x and
y are the screen coordinates. As a ﬁrst approximate, it was assumed that motion in the x-direction was
independent of motion in the y-direction, hence V (x,y) could be separated into the two functions Vx(x) and
Vy(y). Thus, the most simple system of second-order ordinary di erential equations describing the motion
could be written
d2x(t)
dt2 +
dx(t)
dt
+
dVx(x)
dx
=0 , (1)
d2y(t)
dt2 +
dy(t)
dt
+
dVy(y)
dy
=0 . (2)
The functions Vx(x) and Vy(y) were approximated using the experimental data in two steps. First, the
screen was discretized into a mesh (ˆ x,ˆ y) and, using the mouse-cursor position data, approximations of the
velocities (dˆ x
dt and
dˆ y
dt) and accelerations (d2ˆ x
dt2 and
d2ˆ y
dt2 ) were calculated at each mesh point by interpolation
and averaging over a chosen set of the participants’ motion data. Second, using eqs. (1) and (2), the averaged
velocities and accelerations were fed back into the integrals
Vx(x)= 
 
x
d2ˆ x
dt2 (ˆ x)+
dˆ x
dt
(ˆ x) dˆ x, (3)
Vy(y)= 
 
y
d2ˆ y
dt2 (ˆ y)+
dˆ y
dt
(ˆ y) dˆ y, (4)
from which the overall potential function V (x,y) was calculated. Note that this was done independently of
the time when the mouse cursor reached a speciﬁc position on the screen.
Across the three blocks of 12 choices in each experiment, the induced decision spaces evolved to match
the relative values of the available choices. This is most clearly seen in the increase in potential at the
location of the low value choice in the High/Low decision space (see Fig. 4, second column from left). For
High/Low decisions, in early decisions, these spaces showed relatively equal potential at the location of low-
and high-reward choices and across decisions, the location of the high-reward choice decreased in potential
and the location of the low-reward choice increased in potential. Visually, the decision space tipped towards
the high-reward choice demonstrating the facilitation of high-reward choices across decisions.
Further evidence of the change in dynamics across decisions is observed in the gradients of the potential
functions V (x,y) corresponding to decision dynamics during the ﬁrst and ﬁnal block of 20/5 decisions (Fig. 5).
On the high value side of the ﬁgure (right-hand side), both early (red arrows; ﬁrst block) and late (green
arrows; third block) point towards the stimulus on that side of the ﬁgure (i.e., 20). However, there was a
marked changed on the low value side of the ﬁgure, as participants learned the values of the available choices.
In the ﬁrst block (red arrows), motion towards the low value stimulus was likely to persist; red vectors on
the low value side of the ﬁgure point toward the low value stimulus (i.e., 5). In contrast, in the ﬁnal block
(green arrows), the vector of motion changed towards the middle of screen indicating a reduction in the x
component of velocity in the direction of the low value stimulus; green vectors on the low value side of the
8ﬁgure no longer point toward the low value stimulus.
The decision spaces also highlighted di erences between High/High and Low/Low decision dynamics.
During High/High decisions, stronger attraction (steeper slopes) indicated easier decisions (faster, more
direct) and potential at the choice locations was stable or decreased across blocks indicating evolution of
stronger attraction towards high-point choices across decisions. In contrast, during Low/Low decisions,
weaker attraction (shallower slopes) towards the available choices indicated greater persistence of indecision
(slower, less direct choices). The potential at 4 of the 6 low-point choice locations increased across Low/Low
blocks indicating weakening of attraction to these choices. Finally, in the middle of the decision space,
the slope towards choices plateaued, providing tentative evidence of a late ‘saddle point’ prior to eventual
movement towards the available choices. These decision space models provide support for Killeen’s [49] and
Spivey and Dale’s [35] position that a choice between two alternatives can be understood as movement in a
two-well attractor landscape.
Discussion
Across three experiments, participants were sensitive to the relative reward for outcomes in a binary decision
task. As the ratio of the higher reward to the lower increased across experiments, participants were more
likely to reliably choose the outcomes with the higher rewards. Within experiments, for those who learned
to reliably choose the high reward outcomes, the evolution of preference within and across decisions was
similar across experiments. When one outcome was more favorable than the other (High/Low), decisions
were fast and direct. When both outcomes earned equal rewards, decision dynamics depended upon the value
of the available rewards. If both choices earned high rewards (High/High), the decisions were fast and direct,
like High/Low decisions. If both choices earned low rewards (Low/Low), decisions were slow and indirect,
with persistent early instability. Potential surfaces derived from positional coordinates ﬁt with theoretical
characterizations of decision making (e.g, [49, 35, 24]) in which available choices are attractors in a decision
space.
To date, preferential decision making has, in the main, been investigated by analyzing patterns of choice
allocation and response times. Our analyses of decision dynamics potentially provide much greater detail on
the evolution of decisions. In the current experiments, reaction times were sensitive to the greater competition
during Low/Low decisions. However, when we controlled for reaction time (Fig. 3), the evolution of horizontal
velocity towards the available choices remained markedly di erent across conditions. Low/Low decisions were
not simply slower versions of High/Low and High/High decisions; they exhibited a distinct temporal evolution
characterized by persistent early competition that was not observed in the other decisions.
Low/Low decisions induced greater competition than High/High decisions. If one considers that the
rewards available for choices determined the attraction towards the available choices, then one might expect
persistent competition between two strong attractors in High/High decisions. Instead, participants chose
one of the available high value options quickly and directly. Greater competition between similar low value
choices than similar high value choices has been seen in some recent experimental data and in basal ganglia
and di usion models of decision conﬂict [53]. We can see two possible explanations for these di erences in
the current study. The ﬁrst is that participants may have set a reference point based on some function of
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have been experienced as a loss and aversive, even though they remained nominally rewarding. Research on
framing e ects [17] provides convincing evidence that repulsion from perceived bad choices (loss aversion) is a
powerful determinant of eventual choice. In this case, in addition to attraction towards the available choices,
low value choices may have exerted a repulsion on response trajectories, in e ect a dynamic expression of
approach-avoidance conﬂict [54]. In High/High decisions, there would have been no repulsion to counter
the attraction towards the eventual choice resulting in faster more direct trajectories. A weakness with
this account is that repulsion from Low value options would encourage faster and more direct choices in
High/Low decisions than in High/High decisions, which was not observed (in fact there was some evidence
of the reverse e ect). Within a binary choice framework, it is di cult to distinguish attraction towards the
terminal choice from repulsion from alternative choices, but analyses of decision dynamics provide a fresh
approach to distinguishing between these di erent possibilities.
An alternative explanation of greater competition during Low/Low decisions is that the slower uncom-
mitted responding in Low/Low choices was due to a negative incentive contrast e ect. A negative incentive
contrast e ect occurs when following experience with a high value reward, the incentive e ect of a low
value reward is reduced. For instance, animals are known to run slower and less directly towards a less
preferred reward following training with a preferred reward (see [55] for a review). The fact that responding
to High/High and High/Low decisions exhibited similar characteristics suggests that the highest available
stimulus on a trial dominated decision dynamics. Further research under tighter laboratory controls will
facilitate more thorough investigation of these ﬁndings including testing the stability, in longer protocols, of
the di erences identiﬁed herein. In particular, the seeming absence of conﬂict during High/High decisions
relative to High/Low decisions invites further empirical research. In an attractor model, Low/Low decisions
might be understood to constitute a decision space with two weak attractors that fail to capture response
trajectories until later in the decision. In High/High and High/Low decisions, stronger attractors captured
response trajectories earlier and pulled trajectories faster towards completion.
As mentioned previously, some dynamical models of decision-making predict greater competition between
similar low value choices than between similar high value choices. In particular, basal ganglia and di usion
models predict these e ects, but so, arguably, do models that include lateral inhibition, when inhibition is
high [4, 19, 21]. Indeed, the very low conﬂict observed during High/High decisions might constitute evidence
of strong inhibition of the High alternative in these cases. The foregoing models constitute a subset of
sequential-sampling models of decision making, in which information gradually accrues over time to bias the
eventual choice. The current method of collecting detailed movement data on decisions seems particularly
appropriate for the analysis of such models, since they propose processes that unfold over time and eventually
arrive at one of the available options. Dynamic competition between graded continuous representations of
choices may account for gradual shifts in trajectory and ‘changes of mind’ (e.g., [24]). Finally, a number of
these models demonstrate attractor dynamics, which may allow researchers to develop model decision spaces
to compare with decision spaces generated from experimental data.
Within a broader learning context, Sch¨ oner and Kelso [56, 57] proposed a dynamical account of learning
as the integration of intrinsic dynamics and behavioural information. In our experiments, intrinsic dynamics
refer to the attractor landscape in the space of possible responses (including physical, biological and learned
10constraints) prior to exposure to a new decision and behavioural information both mitigates the expression
of those dynamics in that decision and updates the intrinsic dynamics for future decisions. Average decision
spaces, such as those generated in the current analyses, characterise the gradual evolution of preference in
di erent subsets of environmental contingencies. In this way, we approximate the average change in the
intrinsic dynamics of preference and the average impact of behavioural information. Metaphorically, the
decision space is the ‘playing ﬁeld’ on which decisions compete. However, Sch¨ oner and Kelso emphasise
that the greatest contribution of their account is to enable modelling of intrinsic dynamics at the individual
level. In contrast, our average decision spaces necessarily occluded inter-individual di erences in learning
and, thus, di erences in the structure of decision spaces at the level of the individual participant (with
his/her particular physical, biological and learning constraints). At present, many trajectories are required
to establish stable decision spaces and, thus, it was not possible to compare decision spaces at the level of the
individual participant or trajectory. As we learn more about the expression of decisions in two-dimensional
space, then it might be possible to generate decision spaces for individual participants or decisions. For
instance, one might hypothesise a baseline space (e.g., for a condition or an individual), from which a speciﬁc
trajectory might provide deviations that would allow us to generate an hypothetical decision space for that
trajectory. It is our hope that analyses of decision dynamics and the depiction of decision spaces will provide
a ﬂexible testbed for future theoretical development.
Method
Participants were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com), restricted to the United States, with
the following inclusion criteria. Participants were required to have completed a minimum of 100 Mechanical
Turk tasks prior to participation and they were required to have an approval rate 95% or above (i.e., in
95% of cases they were paid for the work they had done), a measure of how e ectively they typically dealt
with Mechanical Turk tasks. Participation in the experiments earned US$0.50. At the beginning of each
participant’s performance, they answered a series of demographic questions (which could be ﬁlled in before, or
after, but not during, their performance). This included simple non-identifying information such as age and
ﬁrst language. From Amazon, participants were forwarded to an external link that presented a “game-like”
interface using Adobe Flash
R  .
At the beginning of the experiment, the following instructions were presented:
Thank you for your work on this brief HIT.
In the next screen, you will see a small green button. Click it to begin the ﬁrst round. There are 36
rounds and in each round you will choose between two shapes to earn points. Di erent shapes give
di erent points. The more points you earn the better! Are you ready?
Click the bottom-right corner of this instruction box to continue...
On each decision, participants clicked on a button at the center of the bottom of the screen to begin their
response, which was made to one of two shapes from the Bodoni font set presented on the top-left or top-
right of the computer screen. This produced, on each decision, a computer mouse-cursor trajectory from the
bottom center to the left or to the right (see Fig. 1).
11Across three experiments, the ratio of the high-value choice to the low-value choice was systematically
manipulated. Participants were assigned to either Experiment 1 (7/5; n = 34), the high-point reward was 7,
and the low was 5, in Experiment 2 (10/5; n = 37), high was 10 and low was 5, and in Experiment 3 (20/5;
n = 55), high was 20 and low was 5. To control for any potential e ect of the Bodoni font, at the start of
each experiment, two shapes were randomly (across participants) assigned to the experiment-speciﬁc high
value, and the two others to the low value (these stimulus-reward pairings remained consistent within each
participant’s set of decisions, so that they could learn these values). In each decision, two of the four symbols
(High 1, High 2, Low 1 and Low 2) were presented as choices, creating three possible choice situations: a high-
value choice versus high value choice (High/High), a high-value choice versus low-value choice (High/Low),
and a low-value choice versus low-value choice (Low/Low). The Flash game presented 36 of these decisions
in a random sequence, 24 in the High/Low condition, and 6 in each of High/High and Low/Low conditions.
On clicking a choice, the points for that choice were presented in green text (e.g., +20) in the middle of the
screen and a point counter in black text at the top of the screen was incremented by that value (see Fig. 1).
Amazon Mechanical Turk provides access to a demographically diverse population [58]. However, though
arguably providing increased ecological validity, the online environment is relatively uncontrolled compared
to typical decision-making experimental contexts. We employed a number of exclusion criteria designed to
exclude participants who did not pay due attention to the experimental task. From a total of 140 participants,
participants who satisﬁed the following criteria were excluded: those whose mean reaction time was below
500 ms (n = 9), those with a reaction time on any trial of greater than 10s (n = 6), those who completed
fewer than 36 trials (n = 5) and those who chose the left or right stimulus on over 75% of trials (n = 2).
Overall, 11 participants were excluded (8%). Following these exclusions, trajectories of the remaining 129
participants were visually analysed and three further participants were removed because of unusual patterns
(e.g., “swooping”, moving directly left or right before moving upwards towards the choices). 126 participants
were assigned to the three experiments as described above.
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17Tables
Table 1: Comparison of ﬁts of binomial linear mixed e ects models to predict High choices in High/Low
decisions
Model No. Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
Intercept only 1 2 2757.19 2769.20  1376.60
Model 1 + Expt 2 4 2754.05 2778.08  1373.03 7.14 2 0.0281
Model 1 + Expt*Trial 3 7 2463.53 2505.58  1224.77 296.52 3 0.0000
Model 1 + Expt* log(Trial) 4 7 2405.13 2447.18  1195.57 58.40 0 0.0000
Table 2: Comparison of ﬁts of linear mixed e ects models used to predict log transformed reaction time
Model No. df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Intercept only 1 4 1283.34 1307.69  637.67
Model 1 + Decision 2 6 1158.34 1194.88  573.17 1 vs 2 128.99 0.0000
Model 1 + Decision * Trial 3 9 877.59 932.39  429.79 2 vs 3 286.75 0.0000
Model 1 + Decision * Trial * Expt 4 21 893.04 1020.91  425.52 3 vs 4 8.55 0.7411
Table 3: Comparison of ﬁts of linear mixed e ects models used to predict maximum deviation
Model No. df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Intercept only 1 4 39931.56 39955.91  19961.78
Model 1 + Decision 2 6 39870.32 39906.86  19929.16 1 vs 2 65.23 0.0000
Model 1 + Decision * Trial 3 9 39859.73 39914.53  19920.87 2 vs 3 16.59 0.0008
Model 1 + Decision * Trial * Expt 4 21 39872.18 40000.04  19915.09 3 vs 4 11.56 0.4817
18Figure captions
Figure 1
Experimental task and learning data. The top panel provides a schematic of the experimental procedure. The
lower left panel depicts mean probability of choosing a High option in a High/Low decision across participants
on consecutive blocks of 6 decisions in each of the three experiments (error bars denote standard errors). The
shaded area indicates probability below 80%, the threshold used to infer that participants learned to choose
the High option, and the dashed line indicates 50%, the choice probability expected by chance. The lower
right panel is a bubble plot of sensitivity to relative reward measured by the log2 probability of choosing a
High option. As relative reward increased (the horizontal axis), more participants reliably chose the High
choice in High/Low decisions. The size of each point is determined by the number of participants that
obtained that value controlled for the number of participants in that experiment (i.e., probability density of
that value within each experiment). The shaded area and black dashed line correspond to the same values
as in the left panel. The blue dashed line indicates the mean log2 probability at each level of relative reward.
Figure 2
Measures of choice conﬂict across blocks of 12 decisions. L/L denotes Low/Low, H/L denotes High/Low and
H/H denotes High/High decision types. (A) The top panel depicts the mean reaction time and bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals (calculated using the R package ggplot2 [59]) in each block of 12 trials in each experiment.
(B) The lower panel depicts the same values for maximum deviation, the furthest point in a trajectory from
the straight line from the initiation of a response to its completion.
Figure 3
Mean horizontal velocity across 100 time steps in the ﬁnal 18 response trajectories. (A) The top panel shows
the evolution of horizontal component of velocity towards the ultimate choice in the response trajectory.
Velocities in the x direction were calculated between consecutive points in each trajectory. (B) The velocity
time series were interpolated into 100 time steps and then the mean velocity at each time step calculated
to depict the time-normalised evolution of velocity. The lower panel shows mean horizontal velocity and
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals during consecutive quintiles of 20 time steps.
Figure 4
Interpolated mean trajectories and decision spaces for blocks of 12 trials within each experiment. (A) The
left column depicts the 20% trimmed mean trajectories for the ﬁnal 18 trials in each experiment. (B) Surface
plots depict inferred potential ﬁelds based on momentary velocities and accelerations derived from positional
coordinates within response trajectories (see text for details). The positions of the circles depicted on the
decision spaces indicate the approximate starting point of trajectories (i.e., 0,0) and the colors of the circles
denote the decision type.
19Figure 5
The gradients of the potential functions V (x,y) corresponding to decision dynamics during the ﬁrst and third
block of 20/5 decisions, with arrows pointing “down hill”, and where the high value stimulus is located on
the right-hand side of the ﬁgure. The ﬁrst block is highlighted with red arrows and the third blck with green
arrows. There is a marked change in the arrow directions on the left-hand side (low value side) between the
ﬁrst and third block, indication of a positive bias towards the high value in the third block, where no such
bias can be seen in the ﬁrst block. Shaded circles denote approximate locations of choice symbols.
20